Last week, at the annual conference for the Foundationfor Apologetic Information & Research, Daniel Peterson had the opportunity
to provide insightful commentary on the intersection of apologetics and the
growing field of Mormon studies (MS) with his presentation "Of 'MormonStudies' and Apologetics." However, instead of adding significant to the discussion, Peterson chose to blow the opportunity and
instead use his presentation as an arena for him to make jabs at persons he
particularly dislikes at the moment.
Sitting in the back on the last row of the conference
room, I was surprised to find myself a target of Peterson, where he repeatedly
misrepresented my positions and arguments, accused me of things I had never
said, and plagiarized portions of my own writings. I have no desire to address
Petersons theses ("Why I dislike Gerald Bradford and Loyd Ericson, and
here are scriptures that I believe defend my polemical apologetics"), I
would like to address Peterson's use of me in his presentation.
This is responding to the original online version of his
presentation, which can be found here.
Misrepresentations:
Peterson's first quotation from me:
"One enthusiastic proponent of Mormon studies has
pointed out what should be obvious, given the general nature of the broader
field of religious studies, that 'those engaged in Mormon studies do not
necessarily have to be Mormon themselves.'"
Here, Peterson pulls a line from me without context to
give the impression that I (or a generic enthusiastic MS proponent) were attempting
to make a profound point that would be obvious to any real scholar of religious
studies--implying that I am a neophyte in religious studies unaware of
"what should be obvious" to real religous studies scholars like
Peterson (who proudly follows his quotation of me with "Let me say right
away that I believe there is a place for such studies. I, myself, in my writing on Islam, work from
within a similar methodology").
To understand that Peterson is misrepresenting me here
and elsewhere, I want to first explain my essay that Peterson repeatedly quotes
and lifts from. Peterson is quoting from my introductory essay for the
inauguratory volume of the Claremont Journal of Mormon Studies, entitled
"Where Is the 'Mormon' in Mormon Studies?" This is based on a
presentation I gave at a conference at Claremont Graduate University that I
conceived of organized in 2010: "What Is Mormon Studies? Transdisciplinary Inquiries into an Emerging Field." Speakers included both Mormons and
non-Mormons from various fields and disciplines--including history, philosophy,
sociology, CES, religous studies, biblical studies, feminist studies,
literature, and publishing--and offered various perspectives that provided
lively and thought-provoking discussion on many issues surrounding MS,
including whether or not MS existed at all. (It is because of conferences like
these that many involved with MS were uninspired by the pontifications of
Peterson's friend Bill Hamblin, which not only offers nothing new, but seems
oblivious to the work being done in MS, and which is quoted mulitple times by
Peterson in his presentation. And I would also add that it is telling that the
only two persons I have witnessed make the critical arguments that Hamblin
makes are he and Daymon Smith--both of which have clearly percieve themselves
as being rejected or not embraced by many actively engaged in MS.)
My presentation at this conference (and the introductory
essay of the CJMS issue) was written as a sort of preface to the conference
(and journal), exploring the question of how the word "Mormon" was
being used to describe MS. (The subtitle of my presentation pointed out three
possible variations "Subject, Method, Object.") I begin by saying:
"When we say that we are doing Mormon Studies, what do we mean? Is this 'Mormon' descriptive or
even prescriptive of the subject—the doer? Is there a type of
methodology that is particular to Mormon Studies—the doing? Or is this
descriptive of the object that is being studied—the done?" (p. 6;
emphasis in original). Thus, my
presentation began with a discussion of those persons doing Mormon studies and
challenges related to who is doing it. Here are two full sentences, from which
Peterson pulls my quotation out of context:
Concerning the subject doing Mormon Studies, it seems clear already that those
engaged in Mormon studies do not necessarily have to be a Mormon themselves. For example, our keynote speaker for our
conference was Jan Shipps, a non-Mormon scholar who has been writing on Mormon
history and culture for nearly half a century—longer than most Mormon-Mormon
Studies scholars today. (p. 6; emphasis added)
Far from how Peterson portrays me—as a naive MS
enthusiast mistakenly believing that I was pointing out something of interest—I
was merely noting this fact for the point I actually wanted to make: that
because of the contentious nature of studying religion, the Mormon/non-Mormon
background of those doing MS inevitably changes the way in which their work is
perceived and utilized. I write:
However, because of the challenging nature of
academically studying religion, whether or not the person doing Mormon Studies
is Mormon (and how she understands her relationship to Mormonism) is
nevertheless a defining factor in what it means for them to be doing Mormon
Studies, regardless of the quality of her work. (p. 6)
I then proceed look at a spectrum of perceptions that are
cast on those engaged in MS, from suspicion and praise for Mormons doing MS by
non-believers to suspicion and praise for non-Mormons by believers.
This brings us to the next misrepresentation of me by
Peterson:
Loyd Ericson, a proponent of Mormon studies who has been
vocally overjoyed at recent changes—both of direction and of personnel—at the
Maxwell Institute, suggested that some
people might need to be excluded from the field of Mormon studies. We’re “force[d] . . . to ask the questions,”
he wrote, “of who should be allowed to participate, how should it be done, and
what should be the objects of these studies. Should boundaries of exclusion be
drawn? Or should all—including the
evangelizing, the apologists, the revisionists, and the anti-Mormons—be allowed
to mingle in the broadest field of Mormon Studies?” (emphasis added)
First of all, I am not “overjoyed” with the new direction
of the MI. “Pleased” is perhaps a better way to put it.
Second, I am not arguing that “some people might need to
be excluded from the field of Mormon studies,” as Peterson claims.
Here is the paragraph Peterson quotes from in its entirety:
In this inaugural issue of the Claremont Journal of Mormon
Studies, we leave the questions of what
Mormon Studies is and where the “Mormon” is located largely untouched.
Instead, the aim of this journal is to make available the best and most
innovative work by graduate students in Mormon Studies—whatever that may be. Nevertheless, the place that “Mormon” plays
in Mormon Studies is an inevitable question as submissions are discussed in
this journal and most other Mormon Studies conferences, events, lectures,
classes, and publications. Its role in
various places perhaps forces us to ask the questions of who should be allowed to participate, how
should it be done, and what should be the objects of these studies. Should
boundaries of exclusion be drawn? Or should all—including the evangelizing, the
apologists, the revisionists, and the anti-Mormons—be allowed to mingle in the
broadest field of Mormon Studies? (p. 12-13; emphasis added)
It is important to understand here that this is one of the
concluding paragraphs in my essay,
following a lengthy look at questions and arguments being made in the larger
question of what constitutes MS. Not only am I not attempting to answer these
questions, I make it explicit that I make no claims on them. To the contrary to
Peterson’s implication, I personally argue for an inclusive understanding of MS
that is self-defined by the very doing of it (see the last paragraph of my CJMS
essay).
While Peterson may attempt to counter that he was non-maliciously
merely pointing out that I raise the possibility of such exclusion by acknowledging
the various opinions on the matter, the intent of his phrasing should be clear.
By such logic I could claim that by pointing out that some Christians wish to
exclude Mormons from being called Christian, Peterson “suggested that Mormons
might not be Christian.” His rhetorical ploy should be clear.
After taking my concluding paragraphs out of context,
Peterson then moves five pages back to the third paragraph of my essay, giving
the impression that, instead of leaving the previous questions unanswered, I am
answering those questions. He writes:
Of
“the Mormon apologists”—who, he wrote under quite different circumstances back
in 2011, are “easily best represented by Daniel Peterson and his colleagues in
the Maxwell Institute at Brigham Young University”—Ericson cautions that “While
they may at least seem to work within academic standards, there still exists an
uneasiness among many about including them into Mormon Studies because of the
belief of many academics that Mormon and/or religious studies is a forum for
studying, and not promoting or defending, religious beliefs.”
This
is taken from my six broad categories of persons doing MS (or the “subjects” that I mentioned at the beginning of my
essay), where I attempt to distinguish those like Robert Millett, whose work is
primarily theological and pastoral, and almost wholly dependent on testimonial
faith claims, from those at the former Maxwell Institute whose work was far
more academic, but done to build and defend faith claims:
The
second group of subjects is made up of the Mormon apologists. Like the previous
group, apologists also make statements of faith explicit in their work.
However, unlike the pastoral Mormons, the apologists’ goal is to not just state
their faith, but to defend or prove the truth claims of that faith, all the
while attempting to do so within parameters of strict academic scholarship.
This group is easily best represented by Daniel Peterson and his colleagues in
the Maxwell Institute at Brigham Young University. As the Maxwell Institute’s
mission statement puts it, their primary
mission includes “Describ[ing] and defend[ing] the Restoration through highest
quality scholarship” and “Provid[ing] an anchor of faith in a sea of LDS
Studies.” While they may at least seem to work within academic standards,
there still exists an uneasiness among many about including them into Mormon
Studies because of the belief of many academics that Mormon and/or religious
studies is a forum for studying, and not promoting or defending, religious
beliefs. (p. 7; emphasis added)
Peterson then makes an egregious misrepresentation by
jumping ahead three pages, and pulling a quotation out of context to make it
seem that I am addressing apologists:
Ericson
allowed, hypothetically, that there
might be a “uniquely Mormon methodology” that one could employ in Mormon
studies. “This methodology,” he says, “would include a faith or
religiously based testimonial as part of one’s argument or discussion. Examples
of this might include appealing to one’s own spiritual confirmation of the
historical reality of Joseph Smith’s First Vision when discussing the
beginnings of Mormonism, basing an understanding of the context of the Book of
Mormon off of one’s belief in its ancient origins, or the claim that the growth
of the LDS Church is due to the Holy Spirit influencing others to convert to
God’s true church.”
Building
off of his misrepresentation of me, he continues:
His statement is fascinating. Notice how it equates
“appealing to one’s own spiritual confirmation of the historical reality of
Joseph Smith’s First Vision when discussing the beginnings of Mormonism” and
“claim[ing] that the growth of the LDS Church is due to the Holy Spirit” with
“basing an understanding of the context of the Book of Mormon off of one’s
belief in its ancient origins.” All of these are subsumed under the
notion of “includ[ing] a faith or religiously based testimonial as part of one’s
argument or discussion.”
One’s
personal spiritual experiences would never constitute appropriate or acceptable
evidence in an academic argument, however appropriate they surely are in
church, and FARMS and Maxwell Institute authors have never appealed to them in
that way. Nor would it be suitable to claim, in a purely secular academic
argument, that the Holy Spirit is the cause of any religious trend or
event. Methodological naturalism reigns supreme in the general academic
world, and for good reason. (Emphasis added).
My
claims are only fascinating because Peterson had completely misrepresented
them.
Here,
Peterson is quoting from an entirely different section of my essay, where I am
not necessarily discussing apologists (or any subject in particular), but am rather posing the question of whether
there can be a method that could be
considered uniquely Mormon. I begin this question beginning with a response to
Alvin Plantinga’s “Advice to Christian Philosophers” by DZ Phillips:
In
response, D.Z. Phillips, in his “Advice to Philosophers who are Christians,”
countered by saying, “in elucidating the surroundings in which belief in God is
held fast, the philosopher is not doing something called Christian philosophy. He
is simply doing philosophy.” For Plantinga, Christian philosophy is a type of
philosophical inquiry which holds a priori certain Christian beliefs. For
Phillips it is nonsense to talk of a unique Christian philosophy; rather, there
is just philosophy. Anything beyond that, such as “Christian philosophy,” is
simply descriptive of Christians using philosophical methodology to explore or
argue about Christian beliefs. (p.9)
I
continue:
Like
Plantinga we may want to talk of doing Mormon history, Mormon philosophy,
Mormon sociology, Mormon anthropology, Mormon cultural studies, and so on.
However, in doing so are we saying that there is a uniquely Mormon way of doing
these things? Or are we just doing history, philosophy, sociology,
anthropology, cultural studies, etc.? (p. 10; emphasis in original)
It is
here that I hypothesize what a uniquely Mormon method might be if there were to
be one:
There
still seems to be a uniquely Mormon methodology that one could use in
Mormon Studies—though whether or not it ought to be included (or ought to be
excluded) is a question still to be explored. This methodology would include a
faith or religiously based testimonial as part of one’s argument or discussion.
. . . [B]ecause testimonials may have a tendency to hinder, rather than
encourage, discussion, both pastoral and anti-Mormons have largely been
excluded from Mormon Studies events. (p.10; emphasis in original)
Contrary
to Peterson’s implying that I was talking about apologetics, this last sentence
makes it clear that I was referring to those I labeled pastoral Mormons and
anti-Mormons, whose testimonial claims are often reason for exclusion. Far from
making some fascinating claim that Peterson has to point out “would never
constitute appropriate or acceptable evidence in an academic argument,” I explicitly and repeatedly point out that such a methodology is generally used as
grounds for exclusion from religious studies. In fact I spend the next few
paragraphs discussing why that is the case, problems that arise from it, and
the infamous [bracketing] of religious beliefs that many in religious studies
have adopted. However, and I still argue for this, that those who approach
Mormonism from a purely faith/testimonial approach be allowed to participate
when they “are invited as such, and not regardless of. For example, an
LDS General Authority may be invited to speak with the understanding that he is
speaking as a denominational representative, and not as a scholar” (p.
10).
Regardless
of whether or not they are involved, I never—as Peterson “fascinatingly”
implies I do—claim that a testimony would “constitute appropriate or acceptable
evidence in an academic argument.”
I
should note though, that Peterson’s claim that “FARMS and Maxwell Institute
authors have never appealed to them in that way” is simply false. Take, for
example, this footnote from S. Kent Brown’s “The Temple in Luke and Acts” in
the feschrift for Truman Madsen, edited by Peterson:
Virtually
all studies on the New Testament Gospels conclude that the Gospel accounts were
written anonymously and that the names of authors were attached only later.
Moreover, most scholars now conclude that each of the Gospels was produced by
the efforts of more than one person—in effect, by schools. As for myself, I
accept the traditional ascription of Luke's Gospel and the book of Acts to
Paul's companion, Luke the Physician.
If I
cared to take the time I could point out dozens of instances, where folks at
the FARMS/MI have appealed to ultimately faith-based dependencies (primarily on
the Book of Mormon and LDS scripture) as a basis for rejecting scholarly consensus
on things such as Mosaic authorship of the Torah, Second Isaiah, New Testament authorship,
biblical criticism in general, etc.
**************************
Having
misrepresented my CJMS essay, Peterson then goes on to misrepresent something
else I had written. He writes:
In an
online exchange with me back in 2010, Loyd Ericson argued that any apologetic
effort attempting to defend the antiquity of the Book of Mormon, the Book of
Moses, and the Book of Abraham inescapably makes faulty assumptions about the
verifiability of those texts. Why? Because the versions of these scriptures
that we have today are in English and date from the nineteenth century, and
because we do not possess (and, hence, cannot examine) the putative
original-language texts from which they are claimed to have been translated.
Accordingly, he said, they cannot plausibly be read, used, tested, or analyzed
as ancient historical documents. They can only be read as documents of the
nineteenth century, as illustrations of, and in the light of, that period. This,
he claimed, is an insurmountable problem.
First
of all, what Peterson is alluding to here is not from a conversation I had with
him, but with one that I had with my friend bhodges (who I believe
actually more-or-less agrees with me now) wherein I linked to a term paper thatI had written while at Claremont for Richard Bushman. Peterson incorrectly claims
that I argue that simply because the original gold-plates text of the Book of
Mormon is unavailable, we cannot plausibly read, use, test, or analyze them as
ancient historical documents.
Once
again, Peterson establishes a straw man to publicly contend with instead of
presenting my actual argument. I never
say that LDS scripture cannot be read as ancient historical documents simply
because the original texts are unexaminable. To the contrary, I am actually
making an apologetic claim against criticisms of anachronisms in the Book of
Mormon that assume a formal understanding of translation. My criticism against
the FARMS-style apologetic approach is that by attempting to prove the
chronosity (doubt that’s a real word) of the Book of Mormon they uphold faulty
assumptions about the Book of Mormon as a translation. Both the critic and the
FARMS apologist are guilty. The critic points to the Book of Mormon and says “If
this were a real translation of an ancient text, then why is X in the Book of
Mormon.” The FARMS apologist responds by pointing to something in the
Mesoamerica, and says “X is a translation of this.” (John Sorenson performedthis repeatedly in his FAIR presentation). My criticism is that both hold an
unnecessary understanding of “translation” in doing so. Both assume they really
know what X is referring to. The problem is not simply one of not having access
to the original text (which is a problem even when dealing with particularities
of a transmitted text that is not translated)—I wholeheartedly agree that translated
documents as a whole can be “read, used, tested, or analyzed as ancient
historical documents.” My contention is that unlike the list of texts Peterson
points to in his FARMS Review response to me, with the Book of Mormon we have
nothing that gives us any sense of how to understand the Book of Mormon as an
untranslated text—despite what the FARMS apologist may want to argue, we have
no certain knowledge of Mormon’s culture, language, and geography. While Nephi
may have come from Jerusalem, Mormon’s language and culture a thousand years
later would have changed dramatically—especially if they were a minor
population mixed into a much large group as the DNA apologists wish to argue.
The only sources for this are the Book of Mormon’s own description—which beg
the question of its sense of being a translation and Joseph Smith’s few
purported claims, which are largely discounted by the FARMS apologists
(location of Cumorah, comments about Lamanites, Zelph, etc). Furthermore, the
Book of Mormon’s “translation” is wholly different than any other sense of “translation.”
I write:
The
translation process for these scriptures is clearly something completely
different from a traditional translation of texts from one language to another.
With the latter, the process involves at least two things: an original text
which is directly used as a source and a translation key or knowledge of two
languages the language of the original text and the language of the translation.
. . .The problem with calling the Mormon scriptures “translations” is that the
process from which the English texts came forth did not include these two
requirements. For at least the Book of Mormon and Book of Moses (and possibly
the Book of Abraham), Joseph Smith did not directly use or (even have) the
original texts. . . . Furthermore, not only did Smith not use the original
texts, he did not have the linguistic skills or tools which are used in any
standard translation. . . . Without either working with original texts or
standard translation practices, these Mormon scriptures are perhaps better
understood as revelations and not translations. (p. 6-7)
Thus,
I conclude:
while
the apologists for Mormon scripture may claim that they are not trying to
“prove” the truthfulness of the scriptures, their very approaches to these
texts are based on an assumption that the historical, and thus divine,
authenticity of the texts must be supportable by means of empirical
verification. This assumption is problematic due to the revelatory nature of
the texts, which may not reflect any verifiable history in themselves other than
the nineteenth-century context in which they came forth. By imposing their
apologetic assumptions on the text, the apologists are ultimately guilty of
friendly fire by creating unnecessary expectations for the scriptures,
confusing their religious truthfulness for historical authenticity, and
displacing that religious truthfulness with that which is not spiritual. (p.
10-11)
Peterson
next attributes the following to me:
A few
members of the church appear to reject apologetics in principle, regarding it
as inevitably, no matter how charitably and competently it is done, more
detrimental than beneficial. They seem to do so on the basis of something
resembling fideism, the view that faith is independent of reason, and even that
reason and faith are incompatible with each other. “The words reasoning and evidence trouble
me,” Loyd Ericson said to me during our Internet discussion. They seem, he
said, to
imply that things like Hebraisms and the NHM inscription will validate my
commitment to Mormonism. This is absolutely and patently untrue and false.
Reasoning and so-called evidences are illusions, in a world that requires
faith. There
is no rationale for angels, gold plates, and a corporeal Divine visit(s). There
is no rationale for a resurrection, atonement, or exaltation. These things defy
reason and logic. There is no possible evidence for these things either. My
faith, my redemption, my happiness/peace are the reasons and evidence for my
devotion.
Building
off his eager misrepresentations and false claims about me, Peterson boldly
announced to the gleeful crowd of apologists:
“Furthermore, in my judgment,
Loyd Ericson is simply wrong. There is, in fact, a rational case to be made for
such propositions as the actual existence of the gold plates of the Book of
Mormon and the resurrection of Christ.”
Besides
the fact that, “in my judgement,” Peterson is wrong about most of what he has
said about me, his claim that there is “a rational case to be made” about these things begs me to ask, “So?” If we ignore Peterson’s strawman of fideism (which
even the actual author of the above quotation now disregards), what pride is
there in saying that a rational argument case can be made? My nephew can make a
rational case for the existence of Santa. Dan Vogel can make a rational case
for the non-existence of the plates. I have made what could be seen as arational argument for the historicity of the Book of Mormon. But even if those
things were proven, I again ask, “So?”What if it can be proven that Joseph had
the plates before they were taken by an angel, or that Jesus rose from the tomb?
Does that prove the divinity of Joseph’s calling, the truthfulness of the
Church, the “correctness” of the “translation,” the love of God, anything about
the atonement, about resurrection of humanity (or of even Jesus)?
***********************
Finally,
despite Peterson’s attempt to castigate me as an enemy in front of his friends
at the conference, I’m quite honored (but not really) that he lifted several of
my own sources from my CJMS essay for his presentation, including some minor
plagiarism surrounding one of the quotes.
In my
CJMS essay, I quoted Alvin Plantinga:
In his essay “Advice to Christian
Philosophers,” Alvin Plantinga argued that “we who are Christians and propose to be
philosophers must not rest content with being philosophers who happen,
incidentally, to be Christians; we must strive to be Christian philosophers.”
(p. 9; emphasis added)
Peterson
this quote and its surrounding text word-for-word, inserting a brief
description of Plantinga in the middle:
In his essay “Advice to Christian
Philosophers,” Alvin Plantinga of the University of Notre Dame,
indisputably among the preeminent Christian philosophers of our time, argued that “we who are Christians and propose to be philosophers
must not rest content with being philosophers who happen, incidentally, to be
Christians; we must strive to be Christian philosophers.” (emphasis added; his
additional words in bold)
It’s
not much, but had he been a student of mine, I would have given the “Well, this
is technically plagiarism, rewrite this part” talk.
His
quotation a few lines down from the former MI statement is from me (which he at
least correctly attributed).
And
his “A couple of almost randomly chosen religious studies programs” really aren’t
that random at all, since he used the UNC-Chapel Hill statement after seeing it
on my essay (11).
There
could be more, but I’ve already wasted too much time on this response.